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In 1999, following a decade long boycott of the political process the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal Katchi - the largest Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu - contested elections 
for the first time. This paper will examine the process of institutionalisation that has 
occurred since that point. One of the main changes to have occurred is that the party 
has sought to reach out beyond the Dalit category in order to secure more votes. 
Increasingly, thus, Dalit parties in Tamil Nadu are taking up the issue of Tamil 
nationalism in a bid to reach out to other castes on an ethno-linguistic basis. The 
paper will chart the pros and cons of such an approach before thinking about 
possible future directions. 
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Introduction 
Eleanor Zelliot’s (1996) classic work charts how 
protests against caste discrimination have 
shifted over time from the early Bhakti saints 
who articulated critiques of inequality in 
devotional songs, through Untouchable 
mobilisation to Dalit protest. The adoption of 
the name ‘Dalit’ was radical in multiple ways, 
not least in that it was a self-chosen term rather 
than an imposed one and sought to invert the 
stigma of untouchability. In early usage, 
furthermore, Dalit sought to go beyond caste 
and include all the downtrodden (Joshi 1987). 
Over time, however, the epithet has come to be 
synonymous with ex-Untouchables and has lost 
its critical edge. Its residual radicalism relates to 
the fact that it still holds out the possibilities of 
cross-Dalit caste mobilisation and, unlike the 
constitutional category of Scheduled Caste, it 
incorporates those ex-Untouchables who have 
converted out of Hinduism yet still suffer the 
social effects of untouchability (Viswanath 
2012). Continued caste discrimination, 
inequality and violence mean that Dalit 
struggles are ongoing but, as Ciotti (2010) 
notes, Dalit groups are increasingly seeking 
alternative ways of describing themselves. 
Ray and Katzenstein (2005: 25) argue that 
Indian social movements have always followed 
a dual logic; simultaneously targeting equality 
and identity. Dalit movements, thus, have 
campaigned both to be recognised as equal 
citizens and for an end to caste discrimination. 
Whilst there are different emphases and foci 
over time, the fight for social justice and 
equality remains constant. The struggle for 
socio-political recognition, however, has 
assumed different characteristics according to 
the varied contexts and subjects in question. At 
different times and in different contexts the 
identity-based strategies of Indian Dalits have 
emphasised religion (see piece by Funahashi in 
this volume), occupation (as in campaigns 
against manual scavenging), caste (see Jodkha 
& Kumar 2007), human rights (Bob 2007), and 
poverty (Govinda 2009).  
Dalit activists would contend that their 
campaign for equality continues unabated no 
matter which epithet they choose to mobilise 
around. Here it is argued that identity-based 
strategies are never simply a case of packaging 
the same demands in different rhetoric; how one 
articulates demands has an impact, though not 
always the one that it is intended to have. Rather 
than superficial labels, names are chosen within 
particular socio-political circumstances. Thus, 
whilst struggles were confined to the social 
sphere the emphasis on caste inequality 
sufficed. As Dalits entered electoral politics, 
however, they increasingly had to reach out to 
other groups in society. Ambedkar’s Scheduled 
Caste Federation, thus, morphed into the 
Republican Party. DS4 (Dalit Soshit Samaj 
Sangharsh Samiti – Dalit and Exploited Group’s 
Struggle Committee) metamorphosed into the 
Bahujan Samaj Party (Majority People’s Party) 
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which in turn pursued a sarvajan (All People) 
strategy to gain political power.  
This paper is concerned with the political 
strategies of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi 
(Liberation Panther Party, VCK) – the largest 
Dalit party in Tamil Nadu. It emerged in the late 
1980s and early 1990s as the Dalit Panther 
Iyyakkam (Movement). At that time is was seen 
as a radical movement that threatened to hit 
back against caste oppressors. In a decade long 
electoral boycott, it was scathing of existing 
political parties and tore away the veneer of 
social justice to reveal the implicit casteism of 
political institutions. Its leader, Thirumavalavan, 
was hailed as a Cheri (Dalit settlement) 
Tornado, a second Ambedkar and a liberator of 
the oppressed. Intermediate castes feared and 
reviled the organisation for infusing hitherto 
dependent and submissive Dalits with pride and 
knowledge about caste and social change. When 
the VCK first contested the elections in 1999, 
therefore, they faced intense hostility; posters 
were defaced with cow-dung, candidates and 
voters were threatened, and large-scale violence 
marred the polling in Thirumavalavan’s 
constituency (Gorringe 2005). 
Ten years on, the party remains a marginal 
player. Following the first election, which it 
contested as part of a Third, alternative, Front, it 
has failed to repeat that venture and been forced 
to ally itself with both of the main parties in the 
state. Dalits cannot win alone in any 
constituency and so the party has had to reach 
out to allies and voters from other castes and 
parties. In this paper we chart the political 
compulsions that render such strategies 
imperative, explore the ways in which the VCK 
has sought to grow beyond the Dalit category, 
and assess the impact of these attempts. First, 
however, we will outline the literature on 
institutionalisation and offer a sketch of Tamil 
politics before turning to the data. 
 
Institutionalisation & Dravidian politics 
 Whilst scholars like Tarrow (1998) and 
Jenkins & Klandermans (1995) regard political 
participation as the aim of protest groups, 
however, many such groups perceive politics as 
corrupt and/or reformist. The process of 
‘institutionalisation’ – whereby movements 
‘develop internal organisation, become more 
moderate, adopt a more institutional repertoire 
of action and integrate into the system of 
interest representation’ (Della Porta & Diani 
1999: 148) – is therefore contentious. Coy & 
Hedeen (2005: 417) highlight the benefits that 
can accrue from institutionalisation including 
material gains, access to influential allies, and 
wider legitimacy. Institutionalisation, however, 
also has costs; movements may become 
‘bureaucratized and technique centred’ with a 
dilution of movement critiques and tactics (Coy 
& Hedeen 2005: 407). It can also, as Piven & 
Cloward (1971) show, result in demobilisation 
or co-optation. As Mosse (2007: 27) puts it: 
‘Empowerment depends upon political 
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representation, but such political capacity is 
gained only at the cost of conceding power to a 
political system’. Understanding how 
movements move from radical actors to political 
contestants, therefore, is vitally important in 
understanding processes of democratisation and 
combating social exclusion (Tilly 1998). 
Whilst India’s democratic system has 
struggled to accommodate oppositional 
movements, according to Lakha and Taneja 
(2009: 316) the recent upsurge of lower caste 
(Dalit and ‘Other Backward Caste’) groups is 
reshaping political institutions. Indeed, these 
authors describe the political accommodation 
and electoral successes of such movements as 
signifying ‘a seismic shift in patterns of political 
participation and structures of power’ (ibid. 
317). Certainly, autonomous Dalit parties have 
kept caste discrimination on the agenda, held 
authorities to account and gained impressive 
electoral victories. The BSP’s formation of 
several governments at the state-level in India’s 
most populous state of Uttar Pradesh (Pai 2002), 
led some commentators to identify a ‘Dalit 
revolution’ in northern India (Jaffrelot 2003) 
even before it won an unparalleled absolute 
Assembly majority in 2008. 
The BSP has undoubtedly effected 
significant social and political alterations in 
Uttar Pradesh and its success signifies an 
expansion of the public sphere as well as 
demonstrating the ability of Dalits to wield 
political power (Pai 2002; Ciotti 2009). 
Representation and electoral success in and of 
themselves, however, do not necessarily reflect 
the interests of the disadvantaged (see for 
example, Jeffery et al, 2001; Mosse 2007). As 
Fraser notes, such ‘politics of identity’ can 
entail the ‘displacement of redistribution and the 
reification of group identities’ (2003: 32). Dalit 
parties can entrench caste identities by 
emphasising the background of parliamentary 
candidates rather than their policies, and once 
parties are in positions of power, those who 
mobilised to demand recognition anticipate 
beneficial outcomes (Chandra 2004). The 
inability of Dalit parties to determine public 
policy jars with the increased expectations of 
followers, resulting in the argument that Dalit 
politics has ‘reached an impasse’ (Shah 
2004:131). 
In other words, Dalit movements across India 
are confronting the problems of 
‘institutionalisation’ and this has arguably 
engendered a split between hard-line and 
reformist activists (Offe 1990). Pai’s (2002) 
work on the BSP distinguishes between 
empowerment from ‘above’ and ‘below’ and 
contends that the Party primarily pursues the 
former, viewing empowerment in purely 
political terms. This emphasis on political 
power has led the BSP to ally with parties 
opposed to Dalit assertion, thus weakening their 
attempts to eradicate caste inequalities. Dalit 
parties in Maharashtra, which was at the 
forefront of post-colonial Dalit mobilisation, 
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have suffered a similar fate (Omvedt 2003), 
indicating an enduring tension between radical 
grass-roots movements seeking to transform 
social relations and political parties seeking 
electoral success. 
Tamil Nadu provides an interesting case 
study since it is one of the more developed 
states in India and has a long history of non-
Brahmin politics and legislation. Although 
Tamil Governments have been rhetorically 
committed to eradicating caste for nearly 50 
years, Dalits continue to lag behind in social 
development indices. The uneven distribution of 
land-holdings means that 58.5% of Tamil Dalits 
work as agricultural labourers and a further 
10.2% are cultivators of marginal landholdings. 
SC literacy rates (63.2%) languish behind those 
of the general population (76.2%) and Dalit 
women are further marginalised with literacy 
rates of 57% (TN Government Statistical 
Handbook 2010). Backward Castes have wielded 
political power in the state since 1962 and 
portray themselves as countering Brahmin 
dominance. Whilst this has led some (notably 
Subramaniam 1999) to regard Tamil Nadu as a 
bastion of social pluralism, Dalit movements 
arose in large part because they faced continuing 
discrimination and were excluded from the body 
politic.  
Autonomous Dalit mobilisation generated a 
forceful (often violent) casteist backlash which 
led Dalit movements to advocate violent means 
(Gorringe 2006). Only in the past 15 years, 
therefore, have Dalit parties entered political 
institutions, and no Dalit party can emulate the 
BSP’s electoral success since the political 
context here is very different (Omvedt 2003). 
Indeed, only since 1998 has Tamil politics 
moved ‘from a two and a half party system to 
bi-polar multipartism’ (Wyatt 2009: 1). Tamil 
Dalit parties have been to the fore in advancing 
this change by seeking to strip Dalit voters away 
from established parties (Roberts 2010: 18). 
The VCK were not the first Dalit party to 
enter Tamil politics but they have been the most 
successful, gaining 3 victories in the smaller 
constituencies of the State Assembly and one in 
national elections. It is difficult to gauge support 
for the party – which has always contested in 
alliance with others – but they have held rallies 
of over 100,000 people in the state capital and 
Wyatt (2009: 120-1) suggests it could swing the 
vote in movement strongholds. Their political 
standing was recognised in the State elections of 
2006 when they contested from 9 seats and in 
2011 when they were allotted 10. Over the past 
few years the VCK have cemented their alliance 
with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagham 
(Dravidian Progressive Federation – DMK), one 
of the two main political parties in the state 
having previously allied with the All India Anna 
DMK – which is the other pillar of Tamil 
politics. 
 
‘The Compulsions of Electoral Politics’
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“The Karunanidhi who used to sport a 
Black shawl, today wears a saffron one. The 
Karunanidhi who used to sing the praises of 
Periyar is today singing the praises of 
Vajpayee ... He has made a big mistake in 
history, he has slipped up. This is an 
unforgivable fault” (Thirumavalavan 
Speech on the DMK alliance with the BJP: 
13/07/99). 
 Before the VCK became a political party, 
Thirumavalavan poured scorn on both 
established parties in equal measure. Both were 
seen as corrupt, casteist and communal in 
outlook. Issues that were portrayed as 
‘unforgivable’ in the movement phase, however, 
have been quietly forgotten now. The VCK has 
allied alternately with both Dravidian parties 
and has become so close to the DMK in the past 
5 years that one popular weekly magazine – 
Junior Vikaten – asked whether he was in 
alliance with the DMK or actually in the party. 
As with any process of institutionalisation (Offe 
1990) there has been a split between the 
pragmatic and idealist wings of the party with 
the latter becoming increasingly disillusioned by 
the political acrobatics of their organisation. The 
tendency of political movements to lose their 
radicalism and get embroiled in ‘politics as 
normal’ once they have been institutionalised is 
often explained away by reference to ‘the 
compulsions of politics’. What these 
compulsions are, and how they work, however, 
are often unspecified. 
The implication is that political institutions 
work in similar manner around the world such 
that the simple phrase is explanation enough for 
political choices. In truth, however, it ranks 
alongside the over-used concept of ‘political 
will’ in its vagueness and lack of analytical 
value (cf. Melo, Ng’ethe & Manor 2011). To 
understand why Dalit parties act as they do, 
therefore, we need an account of the 
circumstances within which they operate and the 
pressures and opportunities that arise as a 
consequence. This will help illustrate the 
specificities of the Tamil case that may be 
obscured by the catch all notion of 
‘compulsions’.  
The most important pieces of the jig-saw are 
the make-up of the political system in TN and 
the constituency that the VCK can reach out to. 
One of the most common questions is why the 
Dalit parties in TN have not been able to 
emulate the success of the BSP in Uttar Pradesh. 
The answer, I would contend, lies in the 
different political circumstances and caste 
make-ups of the two states. The first issue is that 
Tamil politics is dominated by the two 
Dravidian parties that have ruled the state 
continuously since 1967. National parties like 
the Congress, BJP and Communists have little 
presence in the state and are unable to contest 
and win independently. Whilst there have been 
signs that the dominance of the Dravidian 
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parties is weakening (Wyatt 2009), hitherto this 
has only meant that they have shifted  from 
single party rule to being the largest party within 
a coalition. 
Given the stranglehold of the DMK and 
ADMK on state politics, Dalit parties faced the 
choice of allying with their erstwhile foes or 
remaining a pressure group on the fringes of 
institutional politics. Time and again VCK 
attempts to forge a Third Front have been 
frustrated because potential allies have opted to 
join one or other of the main Fronts. The Tamil 
State Congress with which the VCK first 
contested the polls, thus, jettisoned the Third 
Front the moment it received a better offer. In 
subsequent elections calls for a secular and non-
Dravidian front and a Tamil nationalist front 
have similarly fallen on deaf ears.  
Underpinning many of these calculations is 
the question of resources. Election campaigns 
cost money: for posters, hoardings, flags, 
manifestoes and flyers. Even if there is a high 
degree of voluntarism – as there was in the 1999 
election – volunteers need to be fed, 
accommodated and transported from place to 
place. Campaign meetings are expected to have 
sound-systems, stages and seating for the 
audience. If you want to persuade people to vote 
for you, you also need the big leaders to tour the 
constituency. All of this costs money and time 
and again I met people who expected some 
return for their investment. The commonest 
‘returns’ in Tamil politics are access to 
contracts, and state patronage. Those who sign 
off on contracts routinely expect to receive 
commissions from companies or individuals 
bidding for the work. More routinely, 
established politicians use their influence to 
distribute government jobs and resources and 
intervene on behalf of constituents to secure job 
transfers, loans or amenities (running water for 
instance). 
When in alliance with the Dravidian parties, 
the VCK’s electoral expenses are bank-rolled by 
their coalition partners. Not only does this allow 
for a larger-scale and wider reaching campaign, 
it also offers opportunities: cadres can be paid 
for their work; candidates can siphon off some 
of the expenses; and the money can be targeted 
in specific places and locations. Not only this, 
outside of election times the VCK can work 
with and through their allies to secure patronage 
and political influence. As VCK Propaganda 
Secretary Gowthama Sannah put it: 
Sannah: Both the DMK and ADMK have 
been in government for 50 years and grown 
accustomed to government. Extracting 
resources from them and taking them to the 
people was a serious undertaking and we did 
not fully succeed in doing so. This is for the 
future. We need to learn how to do this, we 
too are still learning aren’t we? We have 
created an understanding of the processes to 
some extent though, we have understood how 
to best use the ruling party.
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Hugo: In many places you have also got 
work for people. 
Sannah: We have, that has happened. In 
many places it has happened. We can’t talk 
in terms of thousands of opportunities, but 
certainly in hundreds (Interview, September 
2012). 
 The upshot is that parties choosing not to 
ally with the Dravidian duo have to contest 
elections with their own resources and in a 
scenario where votes tend to be split two ways 
making victory for third parties incredibly 
difficult. Unless and until the emergence of 
strong parties that can split the Dravidian vote, 
autonomous candidates will offer little more 
than a protest vote. The question then is; why 
not exercise that option? Many VCK activists 
insisted that they would rather preserve their 
autonomy and integrity than be beholden to 
larger allies. The question here is whether the 
VCK is a movement with the trappings of a 
party or a fully-fledged party. Given that one of 
the reasons given for joining politics was to 
consolidate Dalit votes what prevents them from 
standing alone?  
 
Dalit vote bank? 
 The second issue that propels Dalit parties 
into the arms of Dravidian coalitions is the lack 
of a consolidated Dalit vote bank. Dalit, we are 
reminded, is a caste category that incorporates a 
diversity of different castes. In Tamil Nadu 
there is no dominant Scheduled Caste in terms 
of numbers. The three main Dalit castes are the 
Pallars, Paraiyars and Arunthathiyars. These 
three are concentrated in particular areas, have 
distinct socio-cultural characteristics, and have 
been mobilised by different political 
organisations. Whilst the VCK has never 
confined itself to one caste and has always 
reached out to all the oppressed it remains, to all 
intents and purposes, a Paraiyar party. Pallars, 
calling themselves Devendra Kula Vellallars, 
have mobilised separately. The ‘Pallar Party’ is 
Dr Krishnasamy’s Puthiya Tamilagam (New 
Tamil Nadu). Arunthathiyars have yet to 
produce a political party, though the Adi-
Tamilar Peravai (Original Tamilian Front) 
looks set to stand in future polls. 
This three-way division effectively splinters 
the Dalit vote, but the issue is yet more 
complicated. Each of these sub-categories is, in 
turn, divided on multiple lines including right 
and left-hand factions; Amma and Atha 
(different ways of saying ‘mother’) sections; 
and different occupational clusters before we 
even get onto people’s differences over politics. 
Given the long history of anti-Hindi Tamil 
nationalism, many Dalits continue to owe their 
political allegiance to one or other of the 
Dravidian parties. This has been cemented by 
ties of patronage and clientelism. Others 
continue to regard politics as corrupt and 
compromised and claim affiliation to one of the 
myriad extra-institutional social movements that 
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work on Dalit issues. Dalit parties, as a 
consequence, have their work cut out to attract 
voters. 
Whilst Roberts (2010: 18) argues that Dalit 
parties have been successful in stripping Dalit 
voters away from established parties, therefore, 
they have usually contested in alliance with one 
of the major parties. K. Armstrong, State leader 
of the Bahujan Samaj Party pointed to this as a 
key issue underlying Dalit disillusionment: 
These people have come away from the 
Dravidian parties. They come from 
households that voted for DMK or ADMK 
and they rejected that to vote for the Dalit 
parties, but now what is happening? The 
Dalit parties are delivering their votes back 
to those same Dravidian parties through 
their coalitions! (Interview August 2012). 
 The BSP has made it a point of principle to 
contest independently in Tamil Nadu, but the 
party has failed to win a single seat as a 
consequence and hardly registers on the political 
scale. Puthiya Tamilagam and the VCK, by 
contrast have secured political recognition on 
the premise that they can mobilise Dalit votes 
for their coalition partner. Contrary to simplistic 
accounts of ‘ethnic head-counts’, however, there 
is no guarantee that caste members will vote for 
‘their party’. Indeed, insofar as caste is 
privileged, people may vote for the opposition if 
caste calculations arise. This is what seems to 
have happened in 2011 in the Sholavandan 
constituency in central Tamil Nadu. VCK 
cadres here openly canvassed for the opposition 
ADMK candidate because he was a Paraiyar 
whereas the candidate in their coalition was a 
Pallar.  
They pointed to a neighbouring reserved 
constituency where every party fielded Pallar 
candidates following the success of one MLA 
from that caste. The fear was that a similar 
situation could arise here too. Whilst this would 
seem to give credence to the notion of a caste 
vote-bank, the issue was not that straight-
forward. For a start, the coalition candidate 
represented the Paatali Makkal Katchi. 
Although the PMK and VCK have been 
working together since 2003, there is a historical 
enmity between the two parties and the unity 
between them does not extend beyond the 
leadership. ‘Had the VCK stood here and 
fielded a Pallar candidate’, I asked, ‘what would 
you have done then?’ The VCK group I was 
talking to laughed: ‘You are really putting us on 
the spot now, aren’t you! Had the VCK stood 
here, then that is a different story. Definitely we 
would have worked for the party’.  
Secondly, Karrupiah, the ADMK candidate 
was a local man, who was related to many of the 
VCK cadres and known by all. There was a 
sense that he might respond to local issues and 
demands, though as of 2012 he had yet to do so. 
Encapsulated here, however, are the issues 
facing Dalit political organisations. Many voters 
are tied to established parties through bonds of
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pat seats or to retain access to the resources and 
flows of patronage that help tie voters to a party, 
Dalit organisations are compelled to ally with 
one or other of the main parties. The alternative 
is to attempt to emulate the BSP in Uttar 
Pradesh and grow beyond the Dalit/caste tag. 
This is precisely what the VCK is endeavouring 
to do at present.  
 
Entering the Mainstream? 
 In a bid to escape their dependence upon the 
two main parties and gain sufficient support to 
contest elections on their own or in alliance with 
a Third Front, the VCK has tried to broaden the 
base of its support. The mantra of the party at 
present is the need to ‘enter the mainstream’. 
Whilst the Dalit Panthers in Maharashtra 
initially sought to effect an alliance of the poor 
and downtrodden; class-based politics has had 
limited success in Tamil Nadu. Indeed, having 
long insisted on the primacy of class, even the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) has turned 
its attention to caste discrimination since the 
emergence of Dalit politics. The tacit 
recognition of the failure of class politics means 
that there are few avenues available to parties of 
the marginalised. ‘Secular’ or ‘anti-communal’ 
politics has been a hall-mark of the VCK which 
has strong links to Christian and Muslim 
organisations. Such an alliance, however, lacks 
numerical strength. 
In any case, communalism is less of an issue 
in Tamil Nadu than it is elsewhere. The politics 
of linguistic nationalism shattered the myth of 
Hindu India in a Tamil context. ‘Secular’ 
politics, thus, has limited mileage in the state. 
Indeed, the one platform on which the party 
could conceivably reach out to people is that of 
Tamil nationalism. Not only is there still a 
strong attachment to Tamil as a language, 
people and country; the conflict in Sri Lanka 
reached its height in the 2000s and there was a 
wave of public outrage about and sympathy for 
the suffering of Tamils on the island. The shift 
to Tamil nationalism had credibility, moreover, 
since the VCK had spoken of a caste-free Tamil 
nation from the outset and Thirumavalavan cut 
his political teeth in student organisations 
campaigning for Eelam and is one of the few 
political leaders from India to have met 
Prabhakaran. 
The rhetoric of Tamil nationalism, however, 
could not mask the fact that this was primarily a 
Dalit party. The VCK, therefore, took two 
momentous steps: the first was to join hands 
with its bitter enemy – the PMK – in a Tamil 
Protection Front. The second was to amend the 
rules stating that only a Dalit could hold office 
in the party. This attempt to enter the 
mainstream however was a risky strategy and it 
is as yet unclear how it will play out. On the one 
hand, the party risks being not Dalit enough for 
the Dalits. On the other, it is not Tamil enough 
for the Tamils. 
 
Not Dalit enough … 
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 The move to bring in non-Dalit leaders has 
been particularly contentious. When posts were 
re-allocated in 2012 there was a decision to have 
four main leaders per District: one would be 
Dalit, one non-Dalit, one from a minority group 
and one woman. As Sannah – VCK propaganda 
secretary put it: ‘you get people saying: “I’ve 
been in the party for 20 years, why am I not 
recognised”’. There are widespread rumblings 
of discontent that suggest that non-Dalit leaders 
are only joining the party to make money and do 
not buy into party principles or carry forward 
the work of the movement. Such leaders find it 
difficult to get the cadre to work for them and 
can find what work they try and do hamstrung 
as a consequence. A number of VCK veterans 
have left the party to look for work, join other 
parties or found their own organisations in part 
because they feel that they have been 
overlooked. 
More insidious than the party cadres feeling 
slighted, there is a perception that cosying up to 
non-Dalits will result in compromises on caste 
issues. Time and again I was told that it would 
mean that perpetrators got let off: ‘He will 
contact one of his caste leaders, who will phone 
our leaders and say: ‘Look, can we reach some 
agreement on this?’ Money will change hands 
and the case will be settled’. Many respondents 
insisted that this was happening. Though few 
could substantiate their allegations, the rumours 
persisted and circulated amongst party 
members. I gained some sense of the reality of 
these accusations when I interviewed a party 
man who had succeeded in becoming Panchayat 
President from a general (not reserved) 
constituency. When I asked how he did it he 
mentioned common issues, money and the 
promise to resolve any disputes without 
recourse to the prevention of atrocities act 
(Interview July 2012). There was a suggestion 
that caste abuses could resurface if such soft-
touch treatment led to the non-Dalits becoming 
emboldened. 
 
Not Tamil enough … 
 In-fighting and rumours occur in any party, 
though, so the question is whether the gains 
from the Tamil strategy are significant enough 
to off-set the disadvantages. Party leaders speak 
of a reduction in caste violence and the ability to 
campaign in the oor (main village) as well as 
Dalit settlements. There are credible suggestions 
of funds from the Tamil diaspora, and 
Thirumavalavan has certainly been abroad to 
speak on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. None of 
these are insignificant, but it is unclear whether 
the reduction in caste violence is a result of 
amity or compromise meetings to hush cases up. 
In any case the social harmony is fragile – as 
seen dramatically in November 2012, with the 
burning of over 250 huts in north-western Tamil 
Nadu. Against this, it is clear that the attempt to 
mainstream the party has not seen huge numbers 
of non-Dalits flooding to the party. 
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Thousands were signed up in membership 
drives, but the one-off contribution of Rs 10 
hardly constitutes a sea-change. Those leaders 
that have joined the VCK have done so as 
individuals rather than in groups and voting 
figures in 2011 when the PMK and VCK 
contested together for the first time, suggest that 
there is no meaningful transfer of votes. For all 
the focus on the Sri Lankan issue in protests, 
party publications and speeches no party 
responded to Thirumavalavan’s call for a Tamil 
nationalist front in 2009. The sense within the 
party was that other outfits were unwilling to 
rally under Dalit leadership. The adoption of 
Tamil nationalism, furthermore, means that the 
party may be criticised on this score as well. If 
the party is not Dalit enough for the Dalits, the 
decision to ally with Congress (implacably 
opposed to Eelam) and failure to resign at the 
height of the massacres in Sri Lanka mean that 
the party is portrayed as opportunistic and 
inadequately committed to the Tamil cause.  
In part the alliance with the Congress in the 
centre reflects the quandary that the VCK finds 
itself in. It needs powerful allies to maintain 
some resource flows to the grassroots. Dalit 
voters, thus, revel in Thirumavalavan’s 
performances in parliament, especially in his 
speeches on manual scavenging and the 
Ambedkar cartoon. The Tamil nationalists, 
however, see his continued support of the 
Congress administration as a betrayal of the 
cause. At times over the year it felt like the 
party was neither one thing nor the other. The 
party has repeatedly echoed Ambedkar in saying 
that securing political power is the way to tackle 
caste, but given the issues faced by the party 
what is the future of the Liberation Panthers?  
 
Whither Dalit liberation? 
 When asked what the VCK was doing 
towards its goal of annihilating caste, 
Thirumavalavan responded: ‘The first step is to 
seize political power. That is why we have 
entered politics and engaged in campaigns to 
raise awareness and break down barriers’ 
(Personal Communication, August 2012). 
Taking their cue from Ambedkar and Kanshi 
Ram, the VCK repeatedly emphasise the 
importance of political power. The notion that 
the VCK could emulate the success of the BSP 
in Uttar Pradesh anytime soon, however, is 
fanciful. Were the Dalit vote consolidated, then 
Dalit parties could claim to represent nearly 
20% of the population but, as we have seen, this 
is far from being the case. The VCK and 
Puthiya Tamilgam, as a consequence, have less 
leverage with which to force concessions or 
policies from their coalition partners. Caste 
violence in northern Tamil Nadu in November 
and December 2012 suggests that the Tamil 
identity route to social harmony is flawed and 
will, at best, take time to be realised.  
So are Dalit parties merely a footnote to 
Tamil politics? Can Dalit leaders merely speak 
truth to power on their own platforms and then 
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hold their tongues in the corridors of power? 
This is certainly the view of many observers and 
activists. In December 2012 when 
Thirumavalavan voted with the United 
Progressive Alliance to increase Foreign Direct 
Investment in retail trade, one social analyst 
commented: ‘Thiruma voted in favour of FDI 
owing allegiance to coalition dharma, he is more 
of a DMK representative than his own man’ 
(Personal Communication December 2012). If 
this is the political fate of the VCK, then 
whither Dalit liberation in the state? For all the 
disillusionment and despair in some quarters it 
is important to recall that activists may have 
higher expectations and standards than others 
and it is also important to look beyond the 
narrowly political impacts of a social 
movement.  
For all the critiques of Dalit politics there is 
universal agreement that the mobilisation of the 
VCK and others has radically transformed caste 
dynamics in the state. The calls to ‘hit back’; the 
education of people about their rights and 
Ambedkar; the calls for people to reject 
subservient labour; direct challenges to forms of 
untouchability; and increased awareness about 
government provisions have changed the 
outlook and aspirations of Dalits in the state. 
Some of the most vociferous critics of the 
movement today owe their conscientisation to it 
and are carrying on the work of the movement 
in multiple forms ranging from offering tuition 
to youngsters, through helping to fund students 
and protesting about atrocities. Even if we 
accept that some party activists are engaged as 
middle-men in brokering compromise deals that 
hush up caste abuses in exchange for money, at 
the grassroots level there is a greater sense of 
confidence about approaching the police. The 
conviction rate for the SC/ST Prevention of 
Atrocity Act is abysmally low, but Dalits have 
lost their fear of police stations and registering 
cases. 
Others have focused on education, 
government schemes for land or livestock or 
migration in search of caste neutral 
employment, and the results are readily apparent 
in rural areas. Dalits may still lag behind caste-
Hindus in most socio-economic indicators, but 
they are catching up in many and have 
surpassed BCs in some pockets.1 Much of the 
violence in northern districts in late 2012 stems 
from status competition as much – if not more – 
than ‘traditional’ caste antipathies. The VCK 
has been to the fore in protests against the 
violence and they have been joined by 
Communist and other parties. Stepping back 
from the frustration of Dalit activists and their 
tales of corruption, co-option and compromise 
perhaps the single largest political contribution 
of Dalit parties is seen here. For the first time 
non-Dalit political parties are taking Dalit 
concerns and anti-Dalit atrocities seriously and 
condemning them publicly. It will take time for 
                                                
1http://www.livemint.com/Politics/Z9XXD3n7cgVwmSQ
anGc9uN/Census-rewriting-SC-ST-narrative.html 
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Dalit parties to be able to re-write the political 
agenda, but this change of heart amongst others 
is itself a form of political recognition. 
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